Background
Singapore Refining Company (SRC) situated on the southern island of Singapore. It contains several tank of chemical including three tanks of naptha that involved in the incident. On 25 Oct 88 at 1.27 pm, one of their naptha tanks caught fire and SRC Fire Service immediately despatched their 2 pumpers, 1 Aerial Platform, 1 Foam Tender and 1 Equipment Tender to respond to the fire. At the same time, SRC also activated the Singapore Fire Service (SFS) Main Operation Centre (MOC). Due to the rapid build-up of the fire, the situation escalated. The fire spread to the two other similar and nearby tanks. This nearly become an island-wide disaster.
Description of Operations
On 25 Oct 88 at 1.27 pm, SFS MOC was activated by SRC. SFS HQ immediately assumed overall command and to be the incident manager. The immediate tasks undertaken by SFS were as follows:
- Activation of related agencies
- Grouping and tasks
- Command and Control
- Recall Network
- Land and Sea Transportation Plan
- Appliances and Equipment
- Foam Compound
- Medical Evacuation Plan
- Contingency Plan
After SFS MOC was being activated, SCDF HQ and Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) MOC were activated to convey the foam compound from the mainland to the incident scene. In addition, PSA Fire Service had sent their 3 Fire Boats. Shell had sent 1 Foam Carrier and 1 Equipment Tender, whereas PCS also had sent 1 Foam Carrier to help out in the fire-fighting.
A Forward Command Post was established at SRC. The incident site was divided into various sectors. Senior and more experienced officers who were either from SFS or Division HQ Staff elements were deployed to supervise and handle the ground operation.
The assisting parties from related agencies were properly detailed and briefed of their respective tasks. The status of command and control was defined to the other parties involved in the operations. Situational reports from the ground force
and related agencies were constantly updated to the SFS MOC, which in turn regularly reported to the Ministry of Home Affair. In addition, SFS personnel were also recall back to their respective station through the pagers recall network. They
were either sent out for deployment or on standby for any demand of manpower.
Due to the incident site is on an offshore island and large number of personnel and equipment needed, Singapore Police Force (SPF) buses, SAF 3-tonners and private buses were called in to provide the land transportation. SRC ferrying service and
SAF Ramp Powered Launcher (RPL) provided the sea transportation of personnel and equipment and vehicles respectively.
Initially, appliances and equipment were found to be not sufficient for foaming operation as SFS Foam Tenders were not capable discharging large quantity of foam at a shorter time. 2 Pathfinder from the Airport Fire Service, 1 Foam Tender from
Esso and 2 Foam Carrier from Public Utilities Board were called in for foaming operation. After 8 hours of chemical fire fighting, the foam compound was barely sufficient to sustain the operation. 5 lorry of Foam Compounds were also requested
from BP, Mobil and Caltex.
A Medical Evacuation Plan was planned out. A First Aid point was set up at the incident site, ambulance was standby at the jetty and hospital was also on standby for any sudden major in-rush of casualties. In addition, a contingency plan on evacuation was catered for the SFS personnel and related agencies if the fire was to escalate.
Background
Part of Nicoll Highway caved into the MRT Circle Line tunnel construction underneath on Tuesday, 20 April 2004. The cause of the incident was attributed as incidental. Although most escaped unhurt, there were three casualties and four fatalities.
Description of Operations
The first SCDF responders from the Central Fire Station arrived at 1542 hrs and were greeted by a chaotic sight of construction wreckage and the remains of a broken highway. Huge piles of concrete slabs, thick steel beams and construction vehicles filled the approximately 15,000 metres square chasm. Close to the Golden Mile Complex, a broken underground pipe was releasing a column of gas into the atmosphere.
As firefighters and paramedics raced to locate and rescue surface casualties, back-up SCDF support and the Related Agencies were activated. By 1610 hrs, the first live casualty with leg injuries was located and was rushed to the SGH within minutes. Two more casualties were found shortly after and conveyed to Tan Tock Seng Hospital by 1625 hrs, and reinforcement from specialist SCDF units, such as, the Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (DART) and Search Platoon arrived. Swiftly the additional forces and nearly 20 rescue appliances including the Heavy Rescue Tender and the Command Vehicles were deployed strategically to manage the operation. The information gathered at the site revealed that four persons were still unaccounted for.
By nightfall, it was clear that the operation would stretch for days, requiring stamina and strategy. Arrangements were made for rescuers to work on shift, and off-duty personnel were activated to sustain the search and rescue operation over a protracted duration.
Teams of rescuers with search dogs sent to comb the incident site were thoroughly briefed about the instability of the mangled mass of debris. At 1807 hrs, the search operation yielded results as the first body of the four missing workers was located and extricated. He was submerged in water and mud, between an office container and a 5-tonne tipper truck 20 metres below ground level.
Close to 0100 hrs on 21 April 2004, the DELSAR Life Detector system was used, but unfortunately, no sign of life was detected. Nevertheless, DART rescuers and the Search Platoon continued to plow the ruins in small groups.
The second victim’s body was extricated by DART personnel at 2338 hrs on 21 April 2004. Though the body was found some five hours before, extrication was difficult as it was wedged between the rear wheels of a truck submerged in murky water. It was a delicate operation as any major movement at the rubble area could consequentially lead to a landslide of rubbles and debris. In addition, it was foremost on the minds of the rescuers to ensure that the body was recovered whole and intact.
On 22 April 2004 at 1215 hrs, the third victim's body was extricated. It was a few metres away from the location of the second victim’s body, and was pinned beneath the undercarriage of a 5-tonne tipper truck. Like the second victim’s body, it was submerged in murky waters where visibility was zero. Rescuers had to dig vertically downwards through a stack of rubbles and debris in three cavities, two of them flooded with water and obstructed by mangled steel beams and struts. But the operation proved to be extremely daunting as the cavities had little room to maneuver and visibility in the flooded cavities was zero.
Search was suspended at 0105 hrs on 23 April 2004 as the Land Transport Authority (LTA) detected stability problems. Grouting was immediately carried out to stabilise the site. Operations for the rest of the morning had to be disrupted whenever there were signs of danger. At dawn, following the grouting work, water was pumped out from the cavities and this allowed the rescuers to descend into the pit to conduct search.
At 1300 hrs, heavy rain caused significant soil erosion and though the rescuers were anxious to locate the last victim, the painful decision to halt the operation had to be made. The rescue operation ceased at 1530 hrs as sending rescuers back into the giant trough risked burying them alive, and further delay to grouting operations by the LTA could affect the structural stability of nearby buildings.
By the end of the 4-day operation, three lives were saved and three bodies were uncovered.
Background
On 7 Aug 1992, SCDF Main Operation Centre received a call for 'Explosion with persons injured' at Ginza Plaza Podium, a 3 storey shopping block with 1 basement. Immediately, 2 pumpers and an ambulance were despatched to the incident site. A fire-fighting and search and rescue operation was carried out.
Description of Operations
On 7 Aug 1992 at 2.13 pm, Main Operation Centre of SCDF received a call for 'Explosion with persons injured' at Ginza Plaza. Two pumpers, PL24 and PL29, and an ambulance, Amb 4, were dispatched to the location immediately. PL 24 arrived at the scene at 2.18 pm and found that a gas pipe above the ceiling at the basement was on fire. PL24 crew immediately connected up a water hose to prevent the fire spreading to the surrounding area. At the same time, the crew also tried to locate and shut off the gas supply using the ceiling hook. With the fire being extinguished and arrival of PL 29, a search and rescue operation was conducted at the basement sector 2. 3 dead bodies were found pinned under several concrete slabs. The spreader and breaking tools were used to extricate the bodies. As more casualties were found, another one pumper was activated for the search and rescue operation and Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (DART) was also activated to handle more difficult situation and in-depth search and rescue operation.
In total, 3 pumpers, 3 DART rescue tenders, 7 ambulances and 1 standby company, together with "D" Division Mobile Forward Command Post, responded to the incident. The operation was concluded on 8 Aug at 9.31 am. As a result of the explosion, there were 61 casualties and 3 persons were found dead.
Background
The above fire happened on 12 July 1992. The fire occurred at the boiler room of the ship tanker "Stolt Spur". Investigation revealed that the cause of the fire was due to the flammable liquid / solvents coming into contact with the naked flame (hot work) at the boiler flat level of the ship. A total of 6 people died in this tragic fire, 60 others were injured, and the estimated property loss was in the region of 4 million dollars.
Description of Operations
SCDF Main Operations Centre received a call on the tanker fire at the Republic Dock in Sembawang Shipyard at 11.12 am on 12 July 1992. Immediately, 2 Pumpers and a Breathing Apparatus Tender were dispatched to the incident site. Upon arrival at the site at 11.14 am, the crew saw flames coming up from the chimney of the ship. A number of workers were reported to be trapped inside the boiler room. At that time, fire-fighting cum rescue operations by the Sembawang Shipyard firemen with 5 cooling jets were in progress.
The SCDF crew set up another 2 jets and brought them into the boiler room at the 1st poop deck level. Subsequently, reinforcement of 3 Pumpers, 5 Ambulances, Mobile Control Unit, ICCU, Rescue Tender, Standby Company and Disaster Assistance and Rescue Team (DART) personnel were deployed to support the operations. Forward Logistics Support Area and First Aid Post were also set up at the Sembawang Shipyard. The fire was eventually put out within 30 minutes (i.e. from 11.14 am - 11.42 am) using a total of 7 jets.
Damping down operations (i.e. from 11.43 am - 2.40 pm) continued till 1440hrs after which all SCDF crew were withdrawn and all appliances were returned to their respective bases.
Damage
Throughout the operation, the fire was confined to 3 levels of the ship. The upper-level exit No.1 door was badly burnt, the middle level metal structures buckled severely at the first poop deck and the lower-level insulation materials at the new boiler was completely burnt.
Background
On 22 May 1997, Control Room at HQ SCDF received a fire call from public informing that a factory was on fire. The premises involved were a single storey chemical treatment plant and a chemical storage area. Highly flammable waste chemicals stored in drums and various container sizes were in the vicinity.
Description of Operations
3 fire engines (PL 40, PL 32 and PL24), a Breathing Apparatus (BA) Tender, an aerial ladder and Damage Control Tender (DCT) were immediately dispatched to the scene.
Background
The Hotel New World disaster happened on Saturday 15 March 1986 at 11.25 am. The 6-level building with 1 basement carpark collapsed suddenly killing 33 people. The subsequent rescue effort saved 17 lives out of the 50 people trapped in the rubble.
The rescue operations involved both the government and the private organisations. The disaster was a real-life test for the then newly established Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF).
Description of Operations
HQ SCDF was activated by Police Radio Division at 11.33 am on 15 Mar 86. SCDF initial response team together with the Rescue Tender was dispatched to assist in the initial rescue activities. At the same time, resources from 3 CD training camps, CD 'D' Division and the CD Volunteer Units were activated.
Immediate Tasks Undertaken
The immediate tasks undertaken by SCDF were as follows:
- Make proper assessment of the situation and formulate initial plans for rescue operations
- Assess the resources (i.e. manpower, equipment and facilities) available
- Work out a command and control system
- Analyse the courses of action and determine the best approach in the rescue operations so that the maximum number of victims trapped could be rescued within the shortest possible time
- Co-ordinate with CD related agencies and private organisations available to assist in the operations
- Get the site cleared of vehicles and people who were not involved in the rescue operations
- Set up a Command post with necessary communication facilities, staff aids, staff support and setting up briefing place etc.
With the above sorted out, planning and orders group meetings were held to work out and implement a concerted and co-ordinated rescue operations.
Rescue Operations
The immediate area of disaster was divided into 3 sectors for easy control and management of rescue operations. Different teams of rescuers were assigned to each sector with Sector Commander taking charge. A senior SCDF Officer was appointed as the overall Site Commander to co-ordinate and oversee the efforts of the sectors.
On the first 1 1/2 days (15 & 16 Mar) the approach was to remove beams and debris from the top and the sides so as to locate and to gain access to those people trapped inside the rubble. During this phase, a few casualties were rescued.
In the later part of the second day (16 Mar), with the assistance from MRT tunnelling experts, a new approach was adopted. Tunnels were made from the sides to reach those trapped beneath. Before tunnelling started, life detector devices were used to pin-point the spots where the victims were trapped. Tunnelling was a slow and risky process. During the tunnelling stage, the rescue efforts from the top were stopped as any movement or vibration could cause further collapse which would endanger the lives of the survivors as well as the rescuers. Through the tunnelling method a number of survivors were rescued.
On the fourth day (18 Mar), attempts to detect any more survivors under the debris were unsuccessful. Hence, the next phase of rapid "cut and lift" method from the top was adopted. This stage witnessed the recovery of a few corpses.
Equipment and Techniques
Equipment and means were key factors in this operation. All the rescue equipment belonging to SCDF were made available for use at the disaster site at short notice. A number of equipment belonging to the SAF, SFS and
those that were donated and loaned to the rescuers by private owners were put to good use.
During the operations, decision on mode of rescue techniques to be adopted was made after consultation with the experts from the organisations such as: Public Works Department Structural Engineers, Mass Rapid Transit Engineers, Chief Medical Officer from the Singapore Armed Forces, Pathologist and SFS. Meetings and briefings were conducted as and when needed, with ground commanders, other agencies, site commanders and experts, not only to brief them but to plan and co-ordinate the next phase of the rescue operations.
The recovery operations were terminated only when all the survivors had been rescued and dead bodies removed.
Role of CD Volunteers
The CD civilian volunteer capability within the community was put to a real test in the Hotel New World disaster. 146 CD volunteers from Moulmein, Cairnhill and Jalan Besar constituencies were among the first CD rescuers on the scene. They worked hand in hand with CD rescuers of the Construction Battalion, CD regulars and reservists, firemen and soldiers to clear the debris from surrounding areas of the disaster site during the initial phase of the rescue operation, in an attempt to locate possible survivors.
Later, more CD volunteer Units from other 36 constituencies came to organize the support facilities to provide food and refreshments for the rescuers deployed at the disaster site. In addition to the above, 96 volunteers from another 19 constituencies, without waiting to be mobilized, also turned up on their own accord to render their assistance. Some CD volunteer instructors and volunteers stayed on, day-after-day, to provide medical assistance or render specialist service as supervisors of heavy equipment. Subsequently, three Civil Defence volunteers namely, Dr Edward Pang, Mr Henry Han Liang Kwang and Tengku Abdul Rahman were given national honours for their part in the Hotel New World rescue operations. All three of them received the Public Service Medal from former President Wee Kim Wee at Singapore Conference Hall that year.
Conclusion
It was unfortunate that the rescue forces had to gain such valuable experience from a disaster of this magnitude. This experience, however enabled the SCDF to re-examine its doctrine of rescue operations, the
suitability of its equipment and the operating procedure in conducting rescue operations.
Background
On 29 April 2004, Alexandra Fire Station was activated to respond to a construction worksite accident at Ayer Rajah Avenue, where the basement construction for Fusionpolis, a high tech township, was undergoing.
Description of Operations
1 fire engine and 1 Red Rhino (PL121, LF121) from Alexandra Fire Station,1 rescue tender (RT411) from Jurong Fire Station, 2 RDART from DART Base, Special Rescue Battalion (SRB), and six ambulances rushed to the scene. As the responders made their way in, an ominous scenario unfolded as dozens of construction workers were rushing out from the incident site with blood on their workclothes, with some seen writhing in pain on the grass verge.
The paramedics" task was clear but the rescuers were presented with a scene of cavernous proportions as thousands of steel reinforcement bars had collapsed and crashed upon the workers below in a 50m by 50m wide area that was 30m below ground level. The only access route was a treacherous lattice of scaffolding ladders.
At the site, rescuers spotted two trapped workers under a heap of reinforcement bars. An immediate tactical decision was made to release the trapped workers and to identify the location of the other trapped casualties.
Immediate treatment of the injured and stabilization of injured workers at ground level was conducted. Safety and stability issues at site were also assessed. The rescue operation at the site required a careful and delicate approach as the matrix of steel bars required manual removal.
A total of 29 casualties were rescued, attended to by the ambulance crew and later conveyed to hospital, whilst 2 fatalities were recovered. Amongst these, a conscious trapped worker, whose thigh was pierced through by a steel rod, was extricated by DART within three hours. An unconscious trapped worker under a heap of twisted metal was extricated within five hours. The search and rescue operation lasted 14 hours.